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INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that was passed by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 9 December 1948 defines genocide as "…acts committed with intent to destroy…." There has been enough
dissatisfaction with that definition to spark a variety of amended definitions. However, al of these definitions continue to
include intent as a major criterion. (1) As a result, students of genocide have been faced with the problem, and continue to
struggle with the methodological issue of how to ascertain intent in a concrete, historical case of genocide. How scholars face
this problem seems to depend on their disciplinary affiliation and, more specificaly, on how their early training defined data
and their sources. The continuing debate sparked by David Irving's assertion of Hitler's innocence in the murder of the Jews
gives this issue renewed urgency.(2)
THE HISTORIAN'S VIEW
Since historians often deal with events that occurred before the birth of any currently living person they are much less
concerned with interviews than with the written record. That record is usualy quite inadequate for studying genocides
because past historians were not very interested in the common people. Therefore, the victims of genocide only rarely appear
in the historical record. That record may consist of letters, diaries, biographies or histories. The question that must always be
asked is whether the author was a participant or a contemporary and for what purpose the record was written. We do know
that history as an academic discipline is of rather recent origin and that early historians usualy wrote in the employ of their
rulers. It was their task to glorify their rulers' reign rather than to create an accurate record of events. Thus, such written
records must always be examined carefuly for their credibility and reliability.
With the increase in bureaucracy, states have increasingly accumulated archives on a wide variety of their activities. But
governments seem to have a very ambivalent attitude toward these records. On the one hand, there always seem to be
matters that they do not commit to these records; on the other hand, they restrict access to them. To the extent that
researchers do obtain access, they need to decide who made the record, how much first-hand knowledge the authors realy
had, what their position was, and in what way they may have biased the record. In addition, when such records deal with
matters outside the country of their origin, they usualy require translation. The researcher may then have the additional task
of verifying the accuracy of the translation. Needless to add, there usualy are relevant events and interactions that are not
recorded and that can only be reconstructed by conjecture and reconstructions based on circumstantial evidence.
The perpetrators of pre-modern genocides reported their deeds with the same pride with which they reported their victories
in wars, with which genocides were often associated. It is only since the Enlightenment, with its belief in  the value of human
life, that perpetrators tried to hide and deny their deeds. Even when they did not deny their culpability, they tried to deflect
public disapproval by using ambiguous semantics. The most famous such case is the Holocaust committed by the nazis under
the label of the "final solution". More recently, the Serbs have been trying to justify their massacres as "ethnic cleansing". But
these are the only cases in the twentieth century in which the perpetrators made no secret of their intent. For the scholar
there remains the problem of what to do about the quite large number of events that wold be recognized as genocides if
intent could be demonstrated.
THE SOCIOLOGISTS' VIEW
In many cases, no written record was created or survived. Eyewitnesses close enough to the top levels of command either did
not survive or refused to incriminate themselves. In addition, the perpetrators of genocides often attempt to hide their deeds
under the cover of war or as a natural catastrophe such as a famine cased by drought.
In such a situation, a sociologist, though preferring the evidence of participants and witnesses, would have to rely on
circumstantial evidence. Fortunately, such evidence is usualy abundant. The first item of evidence is, of course, the
disappearance of a group. Such disappearances occur only rarely due to chance. Additional evidence would consist of a whole
range of events and activities that are unlikely to be chance events. Many ilustrations come readily to mind. In East Pakistan -
4/9/2015 MIGS: Occasional Paper Series: DEFINING THE PERPETRATOR SEEKING PROOF OF INTENT
htp:/migs.concordia.ca/occpapers/defining.html 2/3
now Bangladesh - the kiling of the professional, economic, and intelectual elites in 1972 could only have occurred if it had
been carefuly planned. The persecution, on-going since 1975, of East Timorese who support self-determination is not a
chance event. Nor can the continuing victimization of the non-Moslems in the Southern Sudan be explained without reference
to intent.
Difficulties arise when the event could have been the result of misguided policies or the incompetent execution of wel-
intentioned policies. Thus, the attraction of persecuting a group during wartime is that the perpetrator can claim that the
losses were the unavoidable by-product of wartime conditions. The current government of Turkey stil advances this
explanation in its denial of the Armenian genocide although quite enough evidence has been accumulated to show that it was
a carefuly planned event.
The other time that is favoured by many perpetrators for the persecution of their victims is a period of natural events that
adversely affect agriculture, such as drought, extreme heat or extreme cold, floods, insect plagues, etc. When such events
escalate into famines and mass starvation, it is difficult to find evidence that alows us to distinguish between natural
catastrophes, governmental bungling, and deliberately induced famine conditions. Thus, while it is now quite clear that the
great Ukrainian famine of 1933-34 was produced with intent (3), the origin of the Ethiopian famine of 1984-86 is stil being
debated(4): while the drought has been ruled out as a cause by most observers, there is stil much debate about the relative
contributions of governmental intent, erroneous policies, and the incompetence of the cadres that carried them out.
There exists a smal body of literature on man-made famines.(5) They represent a group of particularly difficult cases from
the point of view of ascertaining intent. It is probably the case that most man-made famines occurred as a result of il-
advised governmental policies. However, in the twentieth century, the technologies of storing and transporting food have
become developed to the point where famines and starvation anywhere in the world can be avoided by timely aid. Therefore,
when such aid and its distribution do not prevent starvation, the researcher is justified in looking for additional evidence that
the famine was intended as a weapon against a group that the regime wanted to victimize. Ethiopia, the Sudan and
Mozambique are cases that come to mind as subjects for investigation along these suggested lines.
THE CONSEQUENCES
As ever student of methodology should know, the choice of research methods wil have an effect on the kinds of results that
can be obtained. The study of intent provides a rather dramatic ilustration of this basic rule. In twentieth century genocides
the study of the intent of the perpetrators has often hinge on finding the written record of the perpetrators' orders.
A good part of the differing interpretations between the Turkish government and the Armenians of the events of 1915 hinges
on the existence of written orders for the genocide.(6) While the Armenians produced such documents, the defenders of the
Turkish position have tried to prove them to be forgeries. What sometimes gets lost in this debate is the great volume of
evidence favoring the Armenian position which makes the existence of written orders quite irrelevant.
Even more dramatic is the debate started by David Irving's 1977 assertion that no written order from Hitler for the
implementation of the final solution exists.(7) Even more dramatic because a series of otherwise serious and respectable
scholars have alowed themselves to be seduced into participation in this preposterous debate.(8) This debate is kept alive by
Irving's attempts to organize speaking tours, by the protests this generates, including evictions from the U.S. and Canada,
and by his many efforts to remain in the public eye.(9)
More recently, the prosecution of Erich Honecker, the leader of the former East Germany, was abandoned. He was to have
been accused of ordering the shooting of any East German who tried to escape over the wal that had been specificaly built to
prevent East Germans from fleeing his country. But the charges were dropped because no written order for these shootings
could be found. The authorities were so embarrassed by their inability to locate such an order that they used the accused's ill
health as an excuse for not going ahead with the case. 
These two cases do not have the same significance. In the case of Hitler, Irving and his supporters attempted to rehabilitate
Hitler by showing that he was not responsible for the evil that was committed in his name. In the case of Honecker, we have
evidence that otherwise reputable jurists have agreed that only the written order is admissible as evidence of intent.
There are two problems with this reliance on the written order to prove intent. The first one is that it leads researchers to
undervalue, or entirely ignore, a large body of relevant evidence. The second problem is that it completely distorts the reality
of which these events are an integral part. I do not propose to go into detail here on the body of relevant evidence because
that would vastly expand this paper. Instead I shal focus on the second problem, the distortion of reality, because it seems to
have the more far-reaching consequences.
The particular distortion of reality of concern here is the postulation of a system of rule in which only the written word carries
authority. In a democratic-bureaucratic society it is conceivable that orders may have to be written down. It is even
conceivable that a Prime Minister or President, upon giving a verbal order, is asked by his minister to put it in writing. While
such a situation is conceivable, it seems to be hardly credible. If an underling were to insist on receiving the dictator's orders
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in writing, he would likely be fired, if not executed, for disloyalty. It is exactly because of the nature of totalitarian and
charismatic leadership that the spoken word carries authority and that the written record is bent to the ends of the ruler.
The records left by totalitarian regimes have two additional problems, both of which stem from their dictators' awareness of
the outside world's disapproval of their misdeeds. The first problem is that they wil manufacture deliberate disinformation,
as Stalin and his henchmen did concerning the Gulag, the Kirov murder, the massacre in the Katyn forest, etc. (10) The
second problem is that they often invent a special terminology that is ambiguous enough to hide their true intentions. Thus,
the actual meanings of such terms can only be confirmed by matching them with the actual events that they referred to.
CONCLUSION
The case of Hitler's presumed order for the implementation of the "final solution," and the debate it sparked, ilustrates how
the choice of a research method can affect the findings. The historians' insistence that there must be written evidence has
engendered a whole debate proceeding on the assumption that such written records are the only evidence admissible. Even
more serious: that assumption alows these scholars to ignore reality and al other evidence bearing on the question of intent
by constructing a fictitious reality. In this fictitious reality charismatic leaders and totalitarian rulers have no way of exercising
their authority except by the written word. What remains puzzling is that this fictitious reality did not appear preposterous
even to its own authors.
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